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Abstract
The common thread behind the three papers presented here is the use of sports
data to test economics theories. The effect of wage inequality on team production
is an important question in labor economics. Data from sports are well suited to
study this problem, with more than ten published papers in the last decade.In the
first paper we analyze the effect of wage inequality both on team performance and
efficiency, using data from Major League Baseball and a stochastic frontier model with
a translog production function. Most studies have examined the impact of inequality
within a linear framework, and found that more equal pay structures enhance team
production. This presupposes that there is no limit to beneficial effects of equality
in pay, an idea which seems suspect.We allow for a possible non-linear relationship
between wage inequality and team performance, and find that most MLB teams
have wage structures which are sub-optimal Furthermore using a semi-parametric
estimation we find that high efficiency teams have a lower degree of wage inequality
than low efficiency teams.
In the second paper we specify and model a more reasonable data generating
process for sportive contests, based on the differences between relative characteristics
of the teams. Monte Carlo experiments reveal that estimating linear models using
winning percentage as a dependent variable results in having biased and inconsistent
estimates, which confounds any inference based on them, thus favoring our modeling
ii
strategy. Using our improved modeling procedure, we allow the relationship between
wage inequality and winning to be non-linear, based on an insight by Lazear (1991),
and we confirm the existence of an optimum level of wage inequality, finding evidence
supporting the ”tournament theory” of Lazear and Rosen (1981).
The third paper performs a test of the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) using the
adoption of the designated hitter rule(DH) by the American League(AL) in 1973 as a
natural experiment. We model the decision to change leagues as a latent variable rep-
resenting the economic calculation made by the decision making unit. Coase Theorem
would predict that better hitting pitchers will move to the National League(NL), but
since we cannot observe pitchers in AL pitching after 1973, we show the reciprocal
of this,i.e. that worse batting pitchers move to the AL. Using a probit model, we
find that indeed, for the 1972 and 1973 period, having batting skills two standard
deviations below the average, would have increased the pitcher’s trade probability by
9.8 percent, holding other variables constant at their means. Before 1972 and after
1973, being a subpar batter would not affect the probability that a pitcher is traded
to AL.The change in regime in the AL, represented by the DH rule, opens the door
to a test of the CT and of Rottenberg’s(1956) novel analysis of the distribution of
baseball talent. It appears that baseball owners and executives are not immune to
the principles of economics or the CT.
iii
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Chapter 1
Team performance, efficiency and
wage distribution in MLB
1.1 Introduction
“In an era of fast-rising salaries for stars, some baseball teams are taking a new
tack: payroll equity ” states The Wall Street Journal1 on April 1st 2006, in an article
announcing the move toward salary equality in Major League Baseball (MLB). The
article goes on mentioning how both owners, managers and even star players (Geoff
Jenkins for example) think that moving toward a more evenly distributed payroll can
improve team performance and “boost team chemistry”.
Economists already knew that, as a consequence of a flurry of papers studying
the effect of wage inequality on team performance in MLB in the preceding decade,
published articles like (Richards and Guell, 1998; Bloom, 1999; Depken, 2000; Frick
et al., 2003; Wiseman and Chatterjee, 2003; Jewell and Molina, 2004; Debrock et al.,
2004) or working papers like Foley and Smith (2003); all found a negative (and
1Russell Adams, ”Leveling the Paying Field” Wall Street Journal, April 1-2 2006
1
statistically significant) effect of wage inequality on team performance.2
This consistently negative effect contrasts with results obtained from studies
in non-sports settings, mainly the executive compensation literature reviewed in Mur-
phy(1999), and from non-team sports settings,e.g. golf (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,
1990b,a) and foot races Maloney and McCormick (2000), that found a positive rela-
tion between pay inequality and performance.
The underlying assumption in the above papers is that the relationship be-
tween wage inequality and performance is linear, or more precisely is independent of
the level of existing wage inequality at which teams (firms) already are.
In this paper we will relax this assumption using a functional form that al-
lows the existence of a non-linear relationship between wage inequality and team
performance.
We find that the relationship is indeed non-linear, and we find an optimum
level of inequality. We also find that most MLB teams have wage structures which are
too spread out, with a larger degree of inequality than the optimum. This explains
why all previous papers have found a negative relationship, since all were measuring
the slope of this function at the mean (or median) of the wage distribution measure
, where it is negative.
Second part of this paper deals with a second result, put forward by Jewell and
Molina (2004) which maintains that “there seems to be no clear relationship between
salary inequality and a team’s ability to produce wins efficiently.”(p.136). Using para-
metric and semi-parametric methods we find that teams with lower wage inequality
do produce wins more efficiently. The idea that pay inequality and performance are
2Numerous studies use data from other sports than baseball, and the result is a mixed bag.
For example: Sommers (1998) found a negative relationship between wage inequality and team
performance using data from hockey,Berri and Jewell (2004) found no relationship using data from
basketball.
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not linearly related was suggested by Lazear (1991): “There is such a thing as too
much effort. In fact, the relevant first-order condition says that the spread should
be chosen so that the marginal cost of effort just equals the value to the firm of the
output produced with it.” p. 93. If, following Lazear and Rosen (1981), the spread
of the pay induces the effort level, it follows directly that there is such a thing as too
much (or too little) inequality 3.For example, too much “effort” could be detrimental
to a baseball team when a player will try to make a spectacular play when is not
necessary, the benefits accruing mostly to the player (the so called “Sports Center
plays” because he gets to be highlighted on ESPN) and not to the team, while if the
player hurts himself the costs are supported by both.
1.2 Literature review
Richards and Guell (1998) studies the effects of salary distribution on team
success, measured as regular season winning percentage and championships, and also
attendance. They find weak evidence that salary structure does have a small negative
effect on the ability of teams to win games. To measure the pay spread within teams
Richards and Guell (1998) use the variance of the salary, concluding that an “increase
of the variance from zero to 4.1∗1012 decreases the regular season winning percentage
by 7.1 points or 11 games”(p. 298).
Bloom (1999) uses various measures(e.g. gini coefficient, coefficient of vari-
ation, ratio measure) of pay distribution to explore the relationship between pay
3Other competing theories explaining and predicting a supposed (negative or non-negative) lin-
ear effect of the wage inequality on performance are the “pay compression”, or “team chemistry”
group (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; Levine, 1991; Milgrom, 1988),and the “damage prevention” theory
(Ramaswamy and Rowthorn, 1991), the latter maintaining the existence of a non-negative effect.
Nevertheless, both “schools” indirectly predict the existence of an optimum level of inequality, given
either by the distribution of the expected fair wage (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988), or by the distri-
bution of the damage making potential (Ramaswamy and Rowthorn, 1991), we expect these to be
non-uniform across employees.
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dispersion and team performance and concludes that more compressed pay disper-
sion is positively related to organizational performance. He uses fixed and random
effects panel data models to estimate the effect of salary Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI) on win percentage, while accounting for the total salary paid by a team. The
effect of salary HHI is negative, and the random effects model is preferable to the
fixed effects model, suggesting that salary HHI is endogenous in his regression.
Depken (2000) uses panel data methods to quantify the relationship between
salary structure and team success, measuring team success by team winning percent-
age and wage disparity by intra-team Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of salaries.
He finds that a 0.13% increase in salary HHI reduces the winning percentage of an
average team with 1%.
Frick et al. (2003) use data from all major North American team sports (foot-
ball, hockey, basketball and baseball) and find heterogeneous results. Wage inequality
has a negative effect on team performance for baseball teams, no significant effect in
the case of football and hockey teams, and a positive and significant effect in the case
of basketball. They use gini coefficients of salaries as a measure of inequality and
control for the level of pay in a team.
Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003) use MLB data from 1985-2002, and control
for the level of wages among teams, concluding that “the greater the team payroll
and the more equally this payroll is distributed among team members, the better the
on field performance of the team.”
Debrock et al. (2004) is the most comprehensive attempt to answer the ques-
tion we are posing in this study. Initially, they use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
of the actual wages as a measure of salary distribution, and find a negative and sig-
nificant effect of inequality on team performance (measured as winning percentage
and attendance). Additionally they construct a conditional measure of inequality,
4
conditional on the distribution of talent within the team using actual productivity
statistics for each player to predict its expected wage in a given year, this predicted
wage is used to calculate the conditional wage average and wage distribution. They
find an optimal conditional inequality, yet they fail to see that a team can err in hav-
ing too much or too little dispersion in its wages compared with the optimum, thus
they conclude, once more, that the wage inequality has a linear negative effect on
productivity. They also arrive at a second conclusion: “the most technologically effi-
cient teams tend to have flatter salary distributions than those that are less efficient”,
which will concern us in the second part of this paper (p. 255).
Jewell and Molina (2004) use a random effects panel data stochastic production
frontier model with a Cobb-Douglas production function to investigate the relation-
ship between payroll inequality and production. Their data covers the 1985-2000
period and contains the winning percentage (as a dependent variable), Gini coeffi-
cient of team salaries per year and a vector of production parameters-offensive ability,
defensive ability, pitching ability. They use a set of excluded variables (MSA popu-
lation /1000000, number of all star players, average age of players, dummy variable
for National League teams) as instruments for the Gini coefficient of salaries, and
use the predicted values in the main model. They conclude: ”The coefficient on gini
implies that a 1% increase in gini leads to a 0.2% decrease in winning percentage.”
(p. 132). They also conclude that:” there seems to be no clear relationship between
salary inequality and a team’s ability to produce wins efficiently.”(p.136)
1.3 Methodology
The major flaw of the above studies is the assumption that the relationship
between wage inequality and team productivity is a linear function of the level of
5
inequality. This paper moves beyond that limitation by considering a translog pro-
duction function in a stochastic frontier framework. Two different parametric models,
one which assumes that the technical inefficiency is constant over time (time-invariant
model) and a second model ,following Battese and Coelli (1992), which allows for the
inefficiency coefficients to change over time (time-varying inefficiency) are used to es-
timate the hypothesized relation. We then use semi-parametric and non-parametric
estimation methods to study the relationship between inefficiency and wage inequal-
ity.
The vehicle through which wage inequality affects the winning percentage of
a team is the effort expended on the field by the players, but including variables such
as on base percentage, slugging percentage, stolen bases per game, etc. in an attempt
to measure team talent, only confounds measures of team effort and team talent. We
believe a much better measure of team talent is the beginning of season average salary
paid by a team since it doesn’t depend on current effort expended by the players, and
a measure of the effort expended by the players is the measure of wage inequality.
1.4 Data
The data used in this paper covers the period 1985-2000 of the US Major
League Baseball (MLB) seasons. During this period there were 26 teams with 16
yearly observations, 2 expansion teams with 8 observations, and another 2 newer
expansion teams with 3 yearly observations, yielding 438 yearly observations covering
16 years. There are not enough individual player data on salaries to compute the gini
coefficient for 5 teams: Boston, Chicago White Sox, Seattle, Minnesota, and Texas for
the 1987 season, and these teams have only 19 yearly observations, thus the sample
is reduced to 433 yearly observation. Data were collected from the following sources:
6
MLB.com, the official site of MLB (winning percentage), from Sean Lahman website
baseball1.com (salaries and regular season team performance) and from Rodney Fort’s
website (http://www.rodneyfort.com) for double check of salaries data.
1.5 Stochastic frontier model with translog pro-
duction function
We intend to study two claims put forward in the literature, i.e. the negative
effect of wage structure on performance and the negative relationship between effi-
ciency and wage distribution. Consequently we adopt a stochastic frontier framework
in order to estimate efficiency. We will consider a baseball team as a firm that pro-
duces wins, in our case the number of wins or the team winning percentage during the
regular season. In a major departure from the established literature we will consider
that the MLB teams produce wins according to a translog production function (see
Christensen and Jorgenson, 1973) for an extended discussion of the properties of this
function), this functional form allows non-linear effects but will revert to the linear
form if the corresponding coefficients are not statistically significant.
Following Jewell and Molina (2004) we will estimate productive efficiency using
several types of stochastic frontier models. The meaning of productive efficiency in
this framework is that of how close to full potential a team is.
The production function takes the form:
Wit = Xit exp (Vit − Uit)
where Wit is team i’s winning percentage in season t, β is a vector of coeffi-
cients to be estimated and Xit are the characteristics of team i in season t (level of
salary, salary inequality ) , Vit is idiosyncratic error, independently and identically
7
normally distributed with mean zero and varianceσ2v .
Different specifications for Uit result in two of the models we use in this paper:
When Uit=ui and ui is independently and identically distributed with a half-
normal distribution, truncated at zero with mean 0 and variance σ2µ
4, and Uit and
Vit are distributed independently of each other and the covariates from the model we
obtain the time-invariant model.(see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, pp.97-100)
If we want to allow technical efficiency to vary over time for each team we
specify Uit = e
{−η(t−Ti)}ui where Ti is the last season for team i, η is the decay
parameter, ui follows the same distribution as above, Uit and Vitare distributed in-
dependently of each other and the covariates from the model, thus we obtain the
time-varying efficiency model. (see Battese and Coelli, 1992) 5
Team-specific inputs include the ratio of the average salary of team i in season
t over the average salary across teams in season t (ms it) and the Gini coefficient of
team i′s salaries in season t(gini it), thus the production function is presented as:
lnwit = β0 + β1 ln(msit) + β2 ln(giniit) + β3
1
2
ln2(msit) + β4
1
2
ln2(giniit)+
+β5 ln(msit) ln(giniit) + vit − uit
(1.1)
We calculated the ratio of the average salary of team i in season t over the
average salary across teams in season t in order to account for the large increase
in players salaries (ms it), using the beginning of season player’ salary to reflect the
ex-ante differences in talent across teams and years. The gini it coefficient of salaries
6
4We use the half-normal distribution of uiin order to avoid the numerical identification problem
raised by Ritter and Simar (1997).
5The results are invariant to using a standard panel data model (random or fixed effects) or
one with a composite error (stochastic frontier model). This suggest that the overall inefficiency
parameter is very small, and is confirmed by the bootstrap results. Since we intend to use the
inefficiency estimates latter in the study we opt for the stochastic frontier framework.
6Jewell and Molina (2004) treat gini as an endogenous variable using a series of instruments to
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within a team was calculated as the as the ratio of the area above the Lorenz curve
and the area below line that signifies total wage equality within a team7, can vary
between 0 and 1, higher gini meaning higher wage inequality. Table 1.2 presents the
summary statistics of our main variables.
1.6 Results and Discussion
Tables 2 reports estimates from the stochastic production model with time-
invariant inefficiency and the model with the time-varying efficiency.8 In comparing
the coefficients across the two models we observe that log (salary ratio), log (gini)
and its square are consistently significant. The square of the logarithm of the salary
ratio, the interaction term between logarithm of gini and logarithm of salary ratio are
not significant in the time-invariant case, nor are they significant in the time-varying
decay inefficiency model.9
predict its values, and then use the predicted values in the main regression. Their explanation of
the endogenous nature of gini is based on the idea of “leadership”, of the existence of unobservable
qualities of players that will raise both the gini and the winning percentage in the same time. The
flaw of this appealing idea is that if the leadership qualities are possessed by individuals with less that
average skill (and consequently less than average wages), this unobservable quality will reduce gini
while increasing the winning percentage, thus canceling the possible correlation between gini and
the error term proposed above. Nevertheless, we have collected the necessary data and proceeded
to perform a Hausman test for endogeneity, which indicates that gini is exogenous at either 1%,5%,
or 10% .( see appendix A for details).
7The formula for gini coefficient is: giniit = 1+ 1n− 2n2∗msit (y1+2y2+ ...+nyn) where y1,...,ynare
individual player salaries arranged in decreasing order, ms is the mean salary of the team i in year
t, n is the number of players from team i in season t.(Bloom, 1999).
8Notes: * Significant at the 10% level based on a z-test, ** Significant at the 5% level based on
a z-test, *** Significant at the 1% level based on a z-test
9To check the robustness of our result to various ways to measure inequality within a team, we
calculated a set of Generalized Entropy (GE) class inequality measures, with GE(α) being more
sensitive to differences in wages near the top of the overall distribution the larger α is, and vice
versa, the smaller (negative) α is the more weight is attached to wage differences at the bottom of
the distribution. GE measures vary between 0 and ∞, with zero representing an equal distribution
and higher value representing a higher level of inequality. We calculated (see Appendix B for
formulae) and estimated both models for GE(-1), GE(0), GE(1) and GE(3.1), summary statistics
are presented in Table 1.13 and the results in Tables 13 and 14. As we give more weight to the wage
differences at the next higher quintile of the wage distribution, the relationship between performance
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Table 1.3 also presents the 95% Efron’s bias-corrected intervals using a para-
metric bootstrapping procedure along the lines of Simar and Wilson (2005, p.13), with
the one-sided error generated for each team separately. The parametric bootstrapped
standard errors are also reported. We deemed necessary to report our bootstrapping
results because conventional approaches for inference in the context of parametric
stochastic frontier models have been found to have “wrongly” skewed residuals,Simar
and Wilson (see 2005) 10, which results in very poor coverage properties of the confi-
dence intervals.
The Wald test suggests in both cases that the regressors are significant in
explaining the variation of the dependent variable, logarithm of winning percentage.
Also a likelihood ratio test was used to test for the presence of inefficiency, the null
hypothesis is that γ =0 (and implicitly that the variance of the inefficiency term is
zero), the calculated statistic (value 20.41) follows a degenerate mixture distribution,
half Chi-square with zero degrees of freedom and half Chi-square with one degree
of freedom, Lee (1993) with (critical value is 3.317 at 1% significance level), thus
rejecting the null.
Using equation (3.1), after plugging in our estimates of the coefficients, and
the mean value of the salary ratio, we obtain a ceteris paribus optimum level of wage
inequality for an average team of gini equal to 0.4979 using the time-invariant model
of inefficiency, or 0.4315 if we use the time-varying model. Both of this optimal
inequality points are less than either the sample mean of gini(0.5656) or the sample
median of gini(0.5720), suggesting that teams use to much wage inequality.
and wage inequality turns from statistically insignificant (GE(-1) with Model 1 in Table 1.14) to the
parabolic shape presented above (GE(3.1) Model 1 in Table 1.15).This implies that wage differences
among well paid players are the driver of the non-linear effect; for more about GE measures. Cowell
(see 2000, 2006)
10The Efron’s bias-corrected intervals estimation were computed using FEAR package in R , for
more Wilson (Forthcoming).
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By setting the value of the mean salary equal to the sample size, and taking
into account only the variables which are significant at 5% significance level, the rela-
tionship between winning percentage and wage inequality appears to be a parabola,
as expected given that we have found the maximum value of this function. See figure
1.1 and 1.2.11
The fact that previous studies have found (almost universally) a negative re-
lationship between wage inequality and team performance is interpreted as a conse-
quence of teams using a suboptimal (too much) wage inequality and the particular
functional form (typically Cobb-Douglas, or linear) chosen by the researchers. Since
most teams are to the right of the maximum point (in figure 1.1 for example), if
you approximate the relationship with a linear function you will get the slope of the
function at the mean (or median), which is negative.
By using the translog, we allow the functional form to revert to the standard
Cobb-Douglas specification if the corresponding coefficients are not jointly signifi-
cant. We reject the null of the Cobb Douglas model by using a likelihood ratio test
(calculated test statistic 13.08) in favor of the alternative that at least some of the
coefficients of the translog are statistically different than zero.
Examining the coefficient of the salary ratio (in Table 1.3) we interpret it as
a 1% increase in the team average wage above the average of the league leads to a
0.21% (or 0.20% in the second model) increase in the winning percentage of a team.
That is for an average team with 81 wins, given the league average wage of 987,945
in the year 1993, in order to win two more games it will have to increase the its mean
salary by about 5% above the league average, that is by $49,397. Conceivably, as
11Even if any (or all) of the terms containing the natural logarithm of the salary ratio would
have been significant, as it appears to be the case for the first model (none of the 95% bootstrap
confidence intervals contain zero) we could have ignored then when predicting at the mean of salary
ratio which is one.
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move up the wage ladder, each additional two games you want to win, will cost 5%
from a higher average wage, thus any team would be faced with an upward sloping
marginal cost of additional wins.
Furthermore, using the bootstrap estimates we obtained in Table 1.3, we were
able to calculate confidence intervals for the predicted values of the winning per-
centage for each actual value taken by gini in the sample. Table 1.4 presents the
predicted winning percentage and the 95% confidence interval for the prediction for
the optimum, mean and median gini in the sample using both models. The Bonfer-
roni inequality, guarantees us at least 90 % that both intervals (optimum versus the
mean or versus the median) are correct for each model.
For the time invariant model we notice the upper bound of both the sample
mean(0.513664) and the sample median(0.513064) being less than the lower bound
of the optimum gini(0.514472), thus we can say that at 90% confidence level the
optimum and the mean(or median) are different statistically.
For the second model( time varying efficiency) the individual 95% confidence
intervals are overlapping, with the optimal(for gini equal to 0.4315) winning percent-
age predicted between 0.5094 and 0.5380 and the predicted winning percentage for
mean gini between 0.5024 and 0.5190. Thus a 90% family (pair wise) confidence
interval doesn’t offer evidence that the mean and optimal gini are indeed different.
The average team (winning half their games), deviates from the optimal level
of inequality, that is the difference in the gini coefficient greater then it should be,
by 0.0677 (0.1341 for the second model), which implies an additional expenditure
with the level of salaries equal to 3.19% (or 12.75% in the second model) in order
to keep the winning percentage constant. If we take the average league wage for
1993 ($987,945), to compensate for the deviation from the optimum wage structure
would cost the average team an extra $31,515 (or $125,962 using the second model)
12
in wages.
The results are consistent with the expected relationship between wage in-
equality and performance, as presented by theoretical papers (Ramaswamy and Rowthorn,
1991; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), which predict (for hetero-
geneous reasons) the existence of an optimal level of inequality.
While mathematically reconcilable with previous studies, this result rejects the
idea that absolute wage equality is optimal (the result most previous studies implied),
suggesting instead the existence of an optimal pay dispersion.
1.7 Salary Distribution and Efficiency
In this section we discuss the relation between efficiency and pay dispersion
within a team. We start by presenting the results from the models estimated above.
We then proceed to use a semi-parametric and non-parametric estimation procedure
that allows us to better estimate the production frontier.
The estimates of productive efficiency (both absolute and relative) from the
time-invariant model are presented in Table 1.5, along with the average number of
wins by a team across all years and the predicted number of wins as a measure
of potential production. We report both the relative estimates, which account for
the fact that one increase in productivity by a team is necessarily a decrease in the
productivity of another, and the productive efficiency estimates from the model. The
former estimates are calculated as a ratio of actual production (Average Wins) over
potential production (Predicted Wins). Also following Schmidt and Sickles (1984), we
normalize the efficiency coefficients to the most efficient team, thus we “should have
more faith” in the former Montreal Expos being 10% more efficient than Minnesota
Twins than we should in the specific technical efficiencies of 0.9099 and 1.
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Table 1.6 presents a ranking of the MLB teams in terms of relative efficiency,
predicted wins and actual average wins. As expected the correlation coefficient be-
tween average wins and predicted wins is positive (correlation coefficient=0.72), mean-
ing that the teams with most productive capacity (predicted wins) do indeed win more
games. The correlation between relative efficiency rank and predicted wins rank is
weaker (correlation coefficient=0.18) suggesting either that the teams’ production
function is unrelated to their productive capacity, Jewell and Molina (2004, p.134)
or, more likely, that the marginal cost of wins curve is extremely steep. This would
imply that teams that have as an objective winning the World Series have to pay a
disproportionate cost for each additional regular season win, because they choose the
optimal productive capacity for playoffs and not for the regular season.
The relationship between a teams’ ability to efficiently produce winning games
and salary distribution is explored in Table 1.7, which presets the rankings of teams
by Average Gini and Relative Efficiency. The correlation coefficient is negative 0.18,
but this result might be driven by the fact that the expansion teams all have very high
gini coefficients, and they all are extremely inefficient. If we drop these expansion
teams from the sample the correlation coefficient becomes positive 0.017, suggesting
no relationship between wage inequality and efficiency
Using the results from the time-varying decay inefficiency model (results in
Table 1.3, Model 2) we have split the teams sample in two, one containing the high
efficiency teams (59 observations) and the other low efficiency teams (288 observa-
tions). We calculated the (in) efficiency term relative to the most efficient team in
every year and we have defined a team to be high efficiency if the inefficiency measure
is larger that 90% and low efficiency if the inefficiency term is lower than 80%, thus
discarding 86 observations. The average salary ratio and the average gini coefficient
by year over the two samples were plotted (see figure 1.3 and 1.4), and do not indi-
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cate that high efficiency firms behave systematically differently that the low efficiency
ones. Two-sample t test with equal (and unequal variances) were conducted to verify
if salary ratio or the gini coefficient are different across the two artificial sample,
all tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of equal means.12 This would appear
to confirm previous results that found no relationship between wage inequality and
efficiency.
To further investigate the relationship between wage inequality and efficiency
we have employed two steps semi-parametric estimation approach,(see Simar, 1992).
Using a non-parametric method to account for the effects of inefficiency, the first step
eliminates the teams which have low efficiency, allowing for a more precise estimation
of the frontier, when compared with the time-varying decay inefficiency model (Model
2).
We use the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) method (see Deprins et al., 1984) which
doesn’t require a convex frontier and also makes no distributional assumptions13. In
the second step, the filtered data containing only the high efficiency teams in every
year, was used to estimate the frontier through panel data methods (see results in
Table 1.8). We can observe that for the high efficiency teams inequality doesn’t
matter, they seem to compete only by raising their average wage compared with the
other teams. Otherwise said, the reason these teams are highly efficient is exactly
because they choose the right level of wage inequality versus the low efficiency ones,
leaving the relative average wage as the last resort.
We used mean comparison tests for the gini and the salary ratio across the
two samples and across years (see Table 1.9). We conclude that high efficiency teams
are the ones with less wage inequality (10 years out of 16 ) or, in the context of
12The two-sample t tests are not presented here, but are available on request.
13For a comprehensive examination of statistical properties of the FDH method (see Simar and
Wilson, 2000)
15
the parametric models estimated before, the ones using the optimal degree of wage
inequality, and that the high efficiency teams do not pay more on average than the
low efficiency teams ( just 4 years out of 16).
The fact that high efficiency teams wage structure is less spread than the
low efficiency teams can be seen in figure 1.5, where the yearly average of the gini
coefficients for the teams in the high efficiency and low efficiency samples are plotted
over time, and the high efficiency teams always have a more compressed pay. Contrast
that with figure 1.6, which plots the yearly averages of salary ratios across the two
artificial samples, which shows the salaries of the high efficiency teams being 4 years
(25% of the sample) above the ones paid by low efficiency teams.
Table 1.10 presents the (output) efficiency measures for all the models we
employed in this study. Montreal Expos (currently Washington Nationals) are con-
sistently the most efficient team in the league, three times the most efficient and once
ranked second.14
Pittsburgh Pirates surprisingly take the most efficient team spot when using
the FDH non-parametric method. Tampa Bay Devil Rays are the least efficient team
in all 4 models.
Concluding this section, parametric methods fail to identify a relationship
between wage inequality and efficiency, while semi-parametric and non-parametric
14The headings of the tables are, in order:
1. Number of total observations in the sample
2. Number of observations 100% FDH efficient.
3. Efficiency Rank
4. Parametric Model 1 Time-Invariant Efficiency
5. Parametric Model 2 Time-Varying Efficiency
6. Non-Parametric Model (FDH)
7. Semi-Parametric Model
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methods (filtering the data using FDH) do find a significant inverse relationship be-
tween wage inequality and efficiency.
1.8 Conclusion
We find that, accounting for a given level of salaries, the relationship between
team performance, measured as regular season winning percentage, and wage inequal-
ity is non-linear. We also observe the mean and the median of the data to be larger
than our estimated optimal inequality, meaning teams have wage distributions too
spread when compared with the optimal one.
Using a semi-parametric method we find the above result is driven by the low
efficiency teams, which consistently have gini coefficients higher than high efficiency
teams. Among the high efficiency teams we observe that wage inequality is not a
significant factor, suggesting that they are at the optimal level. Another finding is
that high efficiency teams compete amongst them by raising the average level of pay.
The suboptimal behavior of teams with respect to wage inequality as an input,
over such a long period of time, can have multiple explications. An explanation could
be that baseball teams, given the lack of either sportive competition (no relegation)
or economic competition (territorial monopoly) just do not have any incentive to
adjust toward optimality, as suggested by Lewis (2003) and tested by Hakes and
Sauer (2006), or that given the long term contracts of the players what drives the
result are just very high transaction costs of instantaneous adjustment.
Another alternative could be that, given the fact that there is no penalty for
failing to win (no relegation), but there is a penalty for failing to entertain and make
money, baseball teams maximize a different objective function than winning percent-
age. This is consistent with the conjecture put forward by Szymanski and Zimbalist
17
(2005) that baseball teams, in contrast with European soccer teams, maximize profit.
1.9 Appendix A - Hausman test for the endogene-
ity of gini
In order to test whether gini is endogenous in our model, we have collected
data similar to the data available in Jewell and Molina (2004). Table 1.11 presents
the summary statistics.
To avoid the weak instruments problem we are looking for variables which are
uncorrelated to winning percentage but correlated with gini. We will regress gini on
average salaries and a series of instruments: runs per game, stolen bases per game,
double plays per game, errors per game, complete games per games, an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 if the team is part of the National League, time and
time squared (Jewell et al., 2004), then save the residuals and run a regression of
winning percentage on salary ratio, gini and the saved residuals; Table 1.12 contains
the results.
We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the residuals from
above is not significantly different than zero, thus concluding that gini is in fact
exogenous.
1.10 Appendix B
The Generalized Entropy class of inequality measures is given by
GE(α) =
1
α(α− 1)
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
yi
y
)α
− 1
]
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, with α 6= 0, α 6= 1, where i is an index for players from 1 to N, yi is the wage of
player i, and yis the average wage in a team.
For α=0 , GE(0) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
ln( y
yi
) is the Theil’s L index, or mean log deviation
measure.
For α=1, GE(1) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi
y
ln(yi
y
) is the Theil’s T index
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Variable Obs Mean Standard Deviation
Winning percentage 433 0.5000 0.0668
gini 433 0.5656 0.0883
Salary ratio 433 1 0.3070
Table 1.2: Summary statistics n=433
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Gini Coefficient Predicted Wpct. Lower Bound Upper Bound
Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2 Model1 Model2
Optimum 0.4979 0.4315 0.5145 0.5235 0.5144 0.5094 0.5175 0.5380
Mean 0.5656 0.5111 0.5106 0.5098 0.5024 0.5136 0.5190
Median 0.5720 0.5105 0.5096 0.5090 0.5010 0.5130 0.5182
Table 1.4: Predicted values and bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for predictions
at the mean of salary ratio, and predicted family confidence of 90% (pairwise).
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Team Name Obs. Average Predicted Efficiency Relative
Wins Wins Estimates Efficiency
Arizona Diamondbacks 3 83.32 83.62 0.9916 0.9553
Atlanta Braves 16 83.99 83.35 0.9936 0.9665
Baltimore Orioles 16 77.03 81.72 0.9841 0.9015
Boston Red Sox 15 83.13 83.22 0.9945 0.9577
California Angels 16 77.70 79.97 0.9897 0.9304
Chicago Cubs 16 74.81 80.74 0.9804 0.8855
Chicago White Sox 15 80.63 78.62 0.9979 0.9843
Cincinnati Reds 16 82.22 80.21 0.9983 0.9839
Cleveland Indians 16 79.31 79.91 0.9928 0.9513
Colorado Rockies 8 74.22 78.33 0.9886 0.9063
Detroit Tigers 16 74.82 79.87 0.9811 0.8956
Florida Marlins 8 68.89 72.22 0.9884 0.9127
Houston Astros 16 81.76 79.58 0.9984 0.9862
Kansas City Royals 16 76.75 80.01 0.9882 0.9181
Los Angeles Dodgers 16 80.94 83.76 0.9890 0.9251
Milwaukee Brewers 16 76.41 77.33 0.9930 0.9469
Minnesota Twins 15 73.76 77.55 0.9858 0.9099
Montreal Expos 16 78.62 75.51 1.0000 1.0000
New York Mets 16 84.11 83.27 0.9954 0.9690
New York Yankees 16 85.86 85.75 0.9947 0.9601
Oakland Athletics 16 81.30 78.53 0.9984 0.9942
Philadelphia Phillies 16 73.13 78.53 0.9816 0.8900
Pittsburgh Pirates 16 75.22 76.75 0.9905 0.9389
San Diego Padres 16 76.75 79.61 0.9880 0.9229
San Francisco Giants 16 81.07 80.53 0.9949 0.9656
Seattle Mariners 15 75.81 78.10 0.9897 0.9295
St. Louis Cardinals 16 80.66 80.66 0.9942 0.9588
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 3 67.03 77.93 0.9864 0.8190
Texas Rangers 15 78.70 79.91 0.9921 0.9437
Toronto Blue Jays 16 83.85 81.64 0.9975 0.9859
Table 1.5: Productive efficiency estimates time-invariant model
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Team Name Obs. Ranking Ranking Ranking
efficiency predicted wins average wins
Montreal Expos 16 1 29 16
Oakland Athletics 16 2 22 9
Houston Astros 16 3 19 8
Toronto Blue Jays 16 4 8 4
Chicago White Sox 15 5 20 13
Cincinnati Reds 16 6 12 7
New York Mets 16 7 5 2
Atlanta Braves 16 8 4 3
San Francisco Giants 16 9 11 10
New York Yankees 16 10 1 1
St. Louis Cardinals 16 11 10 12
Boston Red Sox 15 12 6 6
Arizona Diamondbacks 3 13 3 5
Cleveland Indians 16 14 15 14
Milwaukee Brewers 16 15 27 21
Texas Rangers 15 16 16 15
Pittsburgh Pirates 16 17 28 23
California Angels 16 18 14 17
Seattle Mariners 15 19 24 22
Los Angeles Dodgers 16 20 2 11
San Diego Padres 16 21 18 19
Kansas City Royals 16 22 13 20
Florida Marlins 8 23 30 29
Minnesota Twins 15 24 26 27
Colorado Rockies 8 25 23 26
Baltimore Orioles 16 26 7 18
Detroit Tigers 16 27 17 24
Philadelphia Phillies 16 28 21 28
Chicago Cubs 16 29 9 25
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 3 30 25 30
Table 1.6: Rankings: Efficiency and Wins (based on Table 1.3, Model 1)
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Team Name Obs. Ranking efficiency Average Gini Ranking
Florida Marlins 8 23 1
Tampa Bay Devil Rays 3 30 2
Arizona Diamondbacks 3 13 3
Colorado Rockies 8 25 4
Chicago White Sox 15 5 5
Minnesota Twins 15 24 6
Philadelphia Phillies 16 28 7
St. Louis Cardinals 16 11 8
New York Mets 16 7 9
Texas Rangers 15 16 10
San Diego Padres 16 21 11
Chicago Cubs 16 29 12
Toronto Blue Jays 16 4 13
Milwaukee Brewers 16 15 14
Houston Astros 16 3 15
Cincinnati Reds 16 6 16
Kansas City Royals 16 22 17
Oakland Athletics 16 2 18
Seattle Mariners 15 19 19
Atlanta Braves 16 8 20
Boston Red Sox 15 12 21
Montreal Expos 16 1 22
California Angels 16 18 23
Baltimore Orioles 16 26 24
Los Angeles Dodgers 16 20 25
San Francisco Giants 16 9 26
New York Yankees 16 10 27
Detroit Tigers 16 27 28
Pittsburgh Pirates 16 17 29
Cleveland Indians 16 14 30
Table 1.7: Average Gini and Efficiency Rankings
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Variable Coefficient High efficiency Teams Sample
Bootstrap Standard Error Fixed effects Random Effects
constant -0.5950 *** -0.6221 ***
0.1118 0.1026
log(salary ratio) 0.3058 *** 0.2842 ***
0.0969 0.1014
log(gini) -0.1290 -0.1900
0.3225 0.2991
log(salary ratio) squared -0.0828 0.0214
0.1073 0.0857
log(gini) squared -0.4704 -0.5369
0.4473 0.4156
log(salary ratio) *log(gini) 0.2742* 0.1634
0.1536 0.1621
Observations 175 175
Number of teams 29 29
R-square overall 0.3458 0.3579
R-square within 0.2897 0.2813
R-square between 0.6312 0.6893
Chi-Square(5) 44.59 109.28
Hausman specification test 15.76
Table 1.8: Translog production frontier panel data estimation, Dependent
variable=log (winning percentage), n=175.
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P-values for the null: the means are equal for low vs. high efficiency teams
Variable Gini Coefficient Salary Ratio
Year equal vari-
ance
unequal vari-
ance
equal variance unequal vari-
ance
1985 0.1611 0.1869 0.1905 0.1831
1986 0.0065*** 0.0047*** 0.6686 0.679
1987 0.266 0.3133 0.0528* 0.0739*
1988 0.0052*** 0.0137** 0.2638 0.2664
1989 0.1261 0.1117 0.0018*** 0.0021***
1990 0.014** 0.0489** 0.0011*** 0.0085***
1991 0.1366 0.1656 0.0553* 0.0678*
1992 0.1475 0.1717 0.0143** 0.0184**
1993 0.0013*** 0.0062*** 0.0494** 0.063*
1994 0.0077*** 0.0061*** 0.4291 0.42
1995 0.25 0.271 0.0008*** 0.0004***
1996 0.0068*** 0.0073*** 0.8688 0.85
1997 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.6137 0.6186
1998 0.0343** 0.028** 0.3762 0.3699
1999 0.0249** 0.0346** 0.8932 0.8863
2000 0.015** 0.0152** 0.1813 0.1812
Table 1.9: Tests for mean differences across the two artificial samples.
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TEAM
NAME
(1) (4) (3) (5) (3) (2) (6) (3) (7) (3)
Arizona 3 0.9553 13 0.7384 17 1 0.9261 8 0.8976 21
Atlanta 16 0.9665 8 0.7780 8 8 0.9094 14 0.9215 14
Baltimore 16 0.9015 26 0.7120 23 7 0.8911 22 0.8833 24
Boston 15 0.9577 12 0.7606 12 4 0.9018 17 0.9295 12
California A. 16 0.9304 18 0.7248 21 4 0.8686 28 0.9073 17
Chicago C. 16 0.8855 29 0.6878 26 3 0.8359 29 0.8562 29
Chicago WS 15 0.9843 5 0.7921 2 9 0.9451 4 0.9547 5
Cincinnati 16 0.9839 6 0.7921 3 6 0.9223 10 0.9571 4
Cleveland 16 0.9513 14 0.7610 11 11 0.9512 3 0.9417 7
Colorado 8 0.9063 25 0.6818 29 4 0.9198 12 0.8770 26
Detroit 16 0.8956 27 0.6862 27 8 0.8834 25 0.8772 25
Florida 8 0.9127 23 0.6850 28 4 0.9242 9 0.8741 27
Houston 16 0.9862 3 0.7913 4 6 0.9408 6 0.9575 3
Kansas City 16 0.9181 22 0.7253 20 4 0.8770 26 0.9010 20
L.A. Dodgers 16 0.9251 20 0.7331 18 5 0.9052 15 0.9016 19
Milwaukee 16 0.9469 15 0.7461 14 5 0.9433 5 0.9281 13
Minnesota 15 0.9099 24 0.7092 24 4 0.8837 24 0.8845 23
Montreal 16 1.0000 1 0.8155 1 10 0.9649 2 1.0000 1
NY Mets 16 0.9690 7 0.7800 7 6 0.9020 16 0.9300 11
NY Yankees 16 0.9601 10 0.7699 9 6 0.8904 23 0.9381 9
Oakland 16 0.9942 2 0.7905 5 9 0.9223 11 0.9666 2
Philadelphia 16 0.8900 28 0.6924 25 4 0.8757 27 0.8658 28
Pittsburgh 16 0.9389 17 0.7422 16 10 0.9682 1 0.9376 10
San Diego 16 0.9229 21 0.7240 22 6 0.8977 20 0.8954 22
S.F. Giants 16 0.9656 9 0.7598 13 9 0.9198 13 0.9383 8
Seattle 15 0.9295 19 0.7268 19 8 0.9280 7 0.9050 18
St. Louis 16 0.9588 11 0.7616 10 7 0.9008 18 0.9213 15
Tampa Bay 3 0.8190 30 0.5952 30 0 0.7905 30 0.7900 30
Texas 15 0.9437 16 0.7458 15 3 0.9003 19 0.9115 16
Toronto 16 0.9859 4 0.7877 6 4 0.8962 21 0.9443 6
Table 1.10: Output Efficiency measures
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation
winning percentage 0.500 0.067
Gini 0.566 0.088
mean age 29.220 1.155
all stars 2.185 1.352
runs per game 2.710 2.086
on base plus slugging average 0.737 0.045
stolen bases per game 0.462 0.417
complete games per game 0.073 0.060
earned run average 4.709 1.279
errors per game 0.480 0.364
double plays per game 0.602 0.392
Population/1,000,000 3.775 2.442
Salary ratio 1 0.306
Dummy for National League=1 0.494 0.501
Table 1.11: Summary statistics instrumental variables, n=433
Variables Coefficient Robust stan-
dard error
P-value
Constant 0.4066 0.0299 0.000
Salary ratio 0.0853 0.0096 0.000
Gini 0.0145 0.0477 0.762
Residuals -.1150 .0705 0.103
Table 1.12: Regression testing for endogeneity, dependent variable=winning
percentage, n=433
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GE(-1) 433 1.1523 0.5188 0.1540 3.7178
GE(0) 433 0.6356 0.2083 0.1351 1.1768
GE(1) 433 0.5511 0.2016 0.1328 1.3880
GE(2) 433 0.7145 0.4127 0.1413 3.2922
Table 1.13: Summary statistics GE(α) measures, n=433
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Variable Coeffi-
cient
GE(-1) GE(0)
Bootstrap Stan-
dard Error
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant -.6680 *** -0.6681*** -0.7148*** -0.7291 ***
0.0177 0.0143 0.0220 0.0270
log(salary ratio) 0.1875*** 0.2010*** 0.2147*** 0.2104 ***
0.0355 0.0274 0.0394 0.0365
log(inequality) -0.0270 -0.0645** -0.1273** -0.1518 ***
0.0170 0.0320 0.0514 0.0508
log(salary ratio)
squared
0.0023 -0.0619 0.0718 0.0153
0.1118 0.1141 0.0779 0.0961
log(inequality)
squared
-0.0908* -0.0626 -0.1639** -0.1300 **
0.0477 0.0518 0.0678 0.0668
log(salary ra-
tio)*log(inequality)
0.1070 0.1037** 0.0788 0.0764
0.0519 0.0497 0.0551 0.0536
σ squared 0.0154 0.0146 0.0153 0.0145
0.0016 0.0022 0.0016 0.0024
Γ 0.0276 0.0001 0.0270 0.0001
0.0149 0.0003 0.0145 0.0004
H 0.3061 0.2824
0.1522 0.1518
χ−Squared(5) 77.66 86.35 82.76 84.93
Table 1.14: Translog stochastic production frontier with time-invariant panel data
estimation (Model 1), dependent variable =log (winning percentage), n=433.The
standard errors are bootstrapped using the non-parametric method.
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Variable Coeffi-
cient
GE(1) GE(2)
Bootstrap Stan-
dard Error
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant -0.7291*** -0.7461*** -0.6914*** -0.7046***
0.0281 0.0303 0.0161 0.0240
log(salary ratio) 0.1710*** 0.1569*** 0.1423*** 0.1280***
0.0390 0.0420 0.0332 0.0387
log(inequality) -0.1393** -0.1533*** -0.0653*** -0.0787**
0.0576 0.0596 0.0257 0.0315
log(salary ratio)
squared
0.1076* 0.0646 0.1140 0.0816
0.0627 0.0770 0.0695 0.0745
log(inequality)
squared
-0.1552** -0.1254* -0.0928*** -0.0747*
0.0629 0.0691 0.0352 0.0450
log(salary ratio)
*log(inequality)
0.0214 0.0193 -0.0141 -0.0143
0.0463 0.0464 0.0352 0.0387
σ squared 0.0154 0.0146 0.0154 0.0147
0.0015 0.0024 0.0016 0.0024
Γ 0.0294 0.0002 0.0323 0.0001
0.0262 0.0004 0.0370 0.0005
H 0.2675 0.2573
0.1367 0.1644
χ−Squared(5) 97.00 93.01 74.94 102.62
Table 1.15: Time-varying decay inefficiency panel data estimation (Model 2),
Dependent variable =log (winning percentage), n=433. The standard errors are
bootstrapped using the non-parametric method.
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between predicted winning percentage and wage
inequality (measured as gini coefficient of salaries) implied by the time-invariant
model, with the bootstrapped prediction interval
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Figure 1.2: The relationship between predicted winning percentage and wage
inequality (measured as gini coefficient of salaries) implied by the time-varying
inefficiency model.
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Figure 1.3: Average salary ratio by artificial sample (Low efficiency and High
efficiency teams) across time.
35
Figure 1.4: Average gini coefficient by artificial sample (Low efficiency and High
efficiency teams) across time.
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Figure 1.5: Yearly averages of gini coefficients of the low efficiency and the high
efficiency teams over time.
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Figure 1.6: Yearly averages of salary ratios of the low efficiency and the high
efficiency teams over time.
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Chapter 2
Winning and Wage Inequality in
Major League Baseball
2.1 Introduction
The effect of wage inequality on firm performance is an important question
in labor economics. During the last decade, several papers have attempted to study
it using data from sports, see Table 1.1 for a synopsis. Sports data are uniquely
suited to research this question, firm(team) performance is clearly determined in
sports (winning is always desirable and recorded) and data about inputs (salary,
expenditures or individual performance) is publicly and widely available.1
Previous papers using sports (mainly baseball) data have three major short-
comings: they do not allow for a non-linear relationship between wage inequality and
performance, they fail to specify and model the data generating process of a sportive
contest, and consequently double count the information generated by a single game.2
1North American sports have the added benefit of having a clear winner/loser outcome, when
compared with European sports, which allow for ties.
2We refer here only to empirical papers. Theories about the effect of wage inequality on per-
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In this paper, based on an insight by Lazear (1991), we model firm(team)
performance as a non-linear function of wage inequality, which suggests that there is
an optimal level of wage inequality. Lazear maintains that: ”There is such a thing as
too much effort. In fact, the relevant first-order condition says that the spread should
be chosen so that the marginal cost of effort just equals the value to the firm of the
output produced with it.” p.91.3
We specify a more plausible data generating process for a team sport con-
test, by explicitly taking into account the relative strength of the teams. In order to
check the statistical properties of our procedure we perform Monte Carlo experiments
comparing it to the various models used in the previous papers. We conclude that
formance are numerous. Several suggest wage equality is firm performance enhancing, while others
suggest the opposite happens. The ”pay compression” hypothesis maintains that, when worker coop-
eration is important, reducing the wage disparities between workers will increase firm performance.
Levine (1991) maintains that a relatively flat distribution of wages increases cohesion among work-
ers, and this could lead to increased performance. Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) put forward the idea of the fair wage, the wage each worker believes he deserves, otherwise
said the minimum wage that prevents that worker from actively shirking or sabotaging the firm. If
a company (industry) pays its top employees relatively more compared with other companies, than
its lower quality employees will request a higher wage than identical workers at the other firm or
industry, thus making the wage distribution more compressed than their relative marginal revenue
product might require. The ”damage prevention” hypothesis of Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991)
supports the idea that in any firm there are employees whose effort and expertise a crucial to its
success, consequently these key employees have to be better paid that marginal employees. If the
key players somehow end up being paid less than their perceived fair wage, they will shirk or sabo-
tage the firm, thus causing more damage than if less important employees shirk. The ”tournament
theory” of Lazear and Rosen (1981) maintains that the more spread out the distribution of wages is,
the more intense the effort expended by the workers in attempting to be at the top of the hierarchy.
The key insight of this theory works irrespective of whether the workers are heterogeneous or not,
in that each person is not paid its marginal revenue product. If they are just starting, and are at
the bottom of the hierarchy, they are paid less than their marginal revenue product, while if they
are at the top, they are paid much more that their marginal revenue product. The rents earned at
the top of the hierarchy are the ones that make everybody work as hard as possible, thus increasing
the performance of the firm. In the tournament theory, the higher the average wage of the firm, the
higher the quality of the workers that decide to work for it. Once employed, the amount of effort
put forward is a function of the spread of the rewards, with more effort being expended when the
difference between the highest and lowest paid employee is larger.
3Rottenberg (1956), having foreshadowed The Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) among other things,
appears to have anticipated the ”tournament” theory too: ”The large variation in players’ salaries
can be expected to attract many players who are hopeful that they will finally fall in the upper
levels of the salary distribution. This will cause the average salary of baseball players to be below
the level at which it would lie if the dispersion of salaries were smaller.” p.250.
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using winning percentage as a dependent variable and ordinary least squares estima-
tion of a linear model (the standard in the received literature) produces biased and
inconsistent estimates and that inference based on them is bound to be confounded.
Our model deals with another pitfall of sports economics literature, that is the
double counting of information generated by a single game. Using winning percentage
as a dependent variable counts the outcome of a game once for the winning team and
once for the losing team, to the result that knowing the winning percent of all least
on team in the league allows us to calculate the winning percentage of the last team.
This violates the independence assumption behind the linear models estimation, thus
confounding any conclusions and inference based on it.
2.2 Empirical Literature
The common aspect of all the studies listed in Table 1.1 is the estimation of a
linear model using winning percentage as the dependent variable. While winning is
desirable, the objective of the teams is not a high winning percentage, but winning in-
dividual games. All the studies that have examined the relationship between winning
and wage dispersion have assumed that a linear model with various characteristics
of the teams as independent variables and winning percentage as dependent is the
data generating process. This is suspect, since the winning percentage is in fact an
aggregation of a series of wins, that result from the relative potential of the two teams
involved in each game.
A second problem arises from the double counting of the information gener-
ated by each game. For example, assume team i won its game with team j, then the
winning percentage for team i includes this information as a win, but the same infor-
mation is included in the winning (or in this case the losing) percentage of team j.
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All previous papers studying the problem at hand have made this error, thus further
raising questions about the robustness (mainly inference) of the results.4
2.3 The Model
In this section we explicitly model the data generating process of a team sports
league as being the result of a difference in potential of two teams, and identify the
best way we could estimate such a process. Let i and j indicate two teams , with i 6= j
between 1 and m , where m is the number of teams in the league. Let Ui = Xiβ + i
be the unobservable winning potential of team i with, Xi a set of observable win-
producing characteristics for team i, with β a vector of coefficients, and i a stochastic
term that accounts for unobservable ability and luck. Let Uj = Xjβ+ j be the same
as above for team j, and assume i and j are bivariate normal distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2. In a game between team i and j, the probability that team i
wins is equal to:
Pr (Ui > Uj) = Pr (Xiβ + i > Uj = Xjβ + j) (2.1)
= Pr (i − j > Xjβ −Xiβ)
= Pr (j − i < Xiβ −Xjβ)
= Φ
(
(Xi −Xj) β
σ
)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Normalizing σ = 1
this model is reduced to estimating a probit model where, probability that team i
4One suspect result consistently found by most studies was a negative relationship between wage
inequality and team performance, suspect because it implies that perfect wage equality is the optimal
one. We have showed previously,in chapter1, that this result could be the consequence of estimating
a non-linear relationship by using a linear one, that is estimating a curve using a line.
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wins is:
Pr (Y = 1|X) = Pr (Ui > Uj) (2.2)
= Pr (Xkβ + k > 0|Xk)
where Xk = Xi − Xj and k = i − j. Given a sample Sn = {(Xk, Yk)}nk=1 of
independent observations from the model represented by (2.1)-(2.2), the likelihood
function can be written as:
L(β|Sn) =
n∏
k=1
[Φ(Xkβ)]
Yk [1− Φ(Xkβ)]1−Yk (2.3)
where Xk is the difference between the characteristics of the competing teams cor-
responding to game outcome Yk. Taking logs, we obtain the log-likelihood function:
lnL =
n∑
k=1
{Yk ln Φ(Xkβ) + (1− Yk) ln[1− Φ(Xkβ)]} (2.4)
which can be maximized with respect to β.
2.4 Data
In order to solve the double counting of game level information in the linear
model we will use game level data. We paired game result information with yearly
team characteristics, that is average salary, gini coefficient of salaries, their square
and interaction, information about where the game was played and information about
each teams result in the last game played. To avoid the double counting issue we have
sorted the teams alphabetically and listed a game just once, thus each team is listed
as the first team except the last one. We collected data about various observable
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characteristics of professional baseball teams and data about the outcome of the games
between them. We paired the observable characteristics with each of the games in
which a particular team played and following the model in equation (1) we took the
differences between these teams.5 Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the
observable characteristics of the First Listed Team (FT) and the Second Listed Team
(ST).
The data about the characteristics of the teams (yearly player’s salaries) was
obtained from The Lahman Baseball Database version 5.4 and cross checked with data
from Rodney Fort’s website. Data about games and outcomes was collected from the
Retrosheet Project website games logs. 6 The data covers the 1985-2006 period,
with year 1987 missing due to the fact that not enough information was available to
compute the average and gini coefficient of salaries for a large number of teams.
We then proceeded to estimate a probit model having as our dependent vari-
able whether the team that was listed first has won or lost a particular game. To
determine which team (either the home or the away team) is the first listed team, we
took them in alphabetical order. If a game is already listed when team i plays team
j, it will not appear again when we list the games played by team j. Consequently,
the Washington (former Montreal) team is never listed as the first team. See Table
2.2 for a listing of the teams and number of observations used as dependent variable.
We then proceed to take the difference between the corresponding variables
for the first listed teams (FT) and the second listed teams (ST). The dummy variable
for home advantage, which was one 1 if the first team(or the second team) played at
5This is evidently an inferior solution to having the data about the characteristics of the teams
in each particular game. Obviously, the average salary of the players actually in the lineup in a
particular game contains more information than the average wage of all the players in the team.
Data unavailability makes this solution impracticable at this time.
6The Lahman Baseball Database is available from http://www.baseball1.com. Rodney Fort web-
site is http://www.rodneyfort.com. The Retrosheet Project website is http://www.retrosheet.org.
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home and zero otherwise, will now take the values 1 if the first team played at home
and -1 if the second team played at home. We also used data about how each team
did in the previous game, equal to 1 if the team won its last game and zero otherwise.
A summary of the differentiated data is presented in Table 2.2.
2.5 Results
The estimation results for the probit model given in equation (2.1) with dif-
ferentiated data are presented in Table 2.4 and 2.5. The difference between the two
tables is that the second one is presenting estimation results using dummy variables
for team fixed effects, for both the first listed teams and the second listed teams.7
Given that the team fixed effects coefficients are not significant, we will discuss the
results from Table 2.4.8
Concentrating on the relationship between payroll inequality and team perfor-
mance, the results indicate a non-linear, inverse-U shaped relation. Figure 1 shows
the relation between the probability for the first listed team of winning a game and
its Gini coefficient of salaries, with all other variables held at their respective means,
and the difference is taken with respect to the mean of the second listed teams gini
coefficient. Both the difference in gini coefficient and the difference in gini squared
are significant at 1% significance level. The salary difference is significant at 1% and
the difference of the squared salary is not significant even at 5%, which allows us to
interpret the marginal effect of the salary on the change in winning probability to
7The dummy variables team fixed effects coefficients are not significant so we do not report them
here.
8There is some serial correlation between observations, given that pairs of teams play repeatedly.
We estimated the models described by equation (2.3), with and without team fixed effects, and
accounted for possible clustered sampling using the procedure described by (Wooldridge, 2002, p.
496). Simply put, we treat the observations for the same pair of teams as being part of a cluster,
i.e. being correlated. We treat different cluster as being independent. The results do not differ
substantially and are not presented here.
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be 0.0037, if the first listed team increases its average wage with $100,000 over its
opponent, its probability of winning a game will go up 0.0037, holding the other
variables constant at their mean.
The home advantage dummy variable is significant at 1% and can used to cal-
culate the marginal effect. The change in winning probability due to home advantage
will be the discrete change in probability with all other variables hold at their mean
and the home advantage dummy changing from 1 to -1, and it is equal to 0.0630,
which means playing at home increases the probability of winning with 6.3%, holding
everything else constant at the mean.
The lagged variables, measuring the effect of a team winning its last game on
the probability of it winning the current game, are both significant at 1% for the first
listed team and at 5% for the second listed team. Winning the last game increases
the first listed team’s probability of winning the current game by 0.0119, that is 1.2%
increase in the probability of winning, holding every other variable constant at its
mean.
Figure 2 presents the equivalent of a isoquant, a functional relationship be-
tween the average wage paid by the first listed teams and its Gini coefficient of salaries,
constructed by holding the average winning potential constant at its mean. The figure
illustrates the idea of the existence of an optimal wage inequality,the one that allows
a team to win a given number of games, or maximize the probability of winning a
particular game, while minimizing the average wage paid.
2.6 Monte Carlo Simulations
In the preceding sections we have used a modeling approach heretofore not
used in sports economics literature. In order to investigate the importance and con-
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sequences of this approach, we compare it with the approach used in previous studies
via Monte-Carlo experiments. The alternative approach has been to aggregate the
results in winning percentage and proceed as the received literature does with esti-
mation using OLS or panel data methods. Monte Carlo experiments can give us an
idea about the effect of estimation the data generating process described by equa-
tion (2.1) by using ordinary least square methods.9 Consequently, we take the model
from equation (2.1) to be our ”true” model and X v N+(0, 1) so that X > 0.10
Furthermore, to make the model identifiable we normalize σ = 1.
We have generated m of Xi, where m is the number of teams and Xi is a vector
of characteristics. To keep things simple and avoid correlation problems we defined
Xi to be a 1× 1 vector. Each team plays each other n number of times, and to mimic
the American League we set m=12 and n=14, thus we paired the respective Xi’s
and took the difference, that is, if team i plays team j we calculated the difference
Xk = ∆Xij = Xi −Xj.
In order to determine the outcome of a game we used the ∆Xij to calculate the
probability that team i wins versus team j by drawing from the uniform distribution
on the (0,1) interval. If the draw was less than Φ(β∆Xij), team i won that particular
game, if the number drawn was larger than Φ(β∆Xij) team j won the game, where
Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution.
On each trial, we generate mC2 ∗ n outcomes and the corresponding difference
as described above, with β = 2, and used this data to estimate β by maximizing
the log-likelihood from equation (2.4), the results are presented in the first column of
Table 2.6. 11
9Several studies listed in Table 1.1 use panel data methods, which might attenuate some of the
following findings. Further research is necessary on this issue.
10In our model all characteristics (average wage, gini coefficient) are positive numbers.
11Combinations of n objects taken r at a time nCr =
(
n
r
)
= n!r!(n−r)! .In our case there are 66
combinations of teams and they play 14 games between them which results in 924 games overall.
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We used the generated data to construct several datasets, using OLS to es-
timate β, the results are presented in the last 3 columns of Table 2.6. The logic
behind the way the datasets were constructed was to account for two of the problems
we raised with studies using winning percentage as a dependant variable, the double
counting and the strength of the opposing teams.
The first win percentage dataset is one that is usually used in literature, see
equation 2.5, where Wpcti is the winning percentage for team calculated by dividing
the games won by all the games played. This way of calculating the winning per-
centage is affected by the double counting problem discussed earlier, and completely
ignores the way data is generated , given the fact that it does not include anything
about the characteristics of the opposing teams. Since we have m teams, the sample
size of this data set will be m, one observation for each team.
Wpcti = β0 + βXi + i (2.5)
A second win percentage dataset was constructed attempting to avoiding the
double counting problem. We calculated the adjusted winning percentage only by
including the information from a game that was not counted for another team. For
instance, if the number of teams m = 3 and number of games between them is n = 2
you will have a total of 6 games, and further assume each team wins one and loses one
game with each other. If we use the model from equation (2.5) winning percentage
for team i = 1 is 2/4, for i = 2 is 2/4 and for i = 3 still 2/4. Using the adjusted
winning percentage, the winning percentage for the first team (i = 1) is 2/4, for the
second team (i = 2) is 1/2 and the all the information about the games played by the
third team (i = 3) is already included in the previous two calculations, thus there is
no observation for the third team. Let i and j indicate two teams, then the adjusted
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winning percentage for team i is:
AdjWpcti =
m∑
j=i+1
n∑
l=1
Oijl
(m− i)n (2.6)
where i = 1,m− 1 and Oijl is the outcome of the lthgame between i and j,
equal to 1 if team i won, zero if team j won. Using this adjusted winning percentage
we use OLS to estimate the following model:
AdjWpcti = β0 + βXi + i (2.7)
thus we have 11 observations, one for each team except the last, the results
are presented in column 4 of Table 2.6.
The last dataset was constructed in an attempt to incorporate the strength
of the opposing teams in an OLS framework. Using the above calculated adjusted
winning percentage, we computed a generalized difference variable,12
∆X =
m−1∑
i=1
i<j
(Xi −Xj)
(m− i)n (2.8)
which is the average of all the differences between team i’s potential or strength
and team j’s. Consequently, the last model to be estimated using OLS is given by:
AdjWpcti = β0 + β∆X + i (2.9)
and the results are presented in the last column of Table 2.6.
12Hakes and Sauer (2006) gets at this problem and attempt to solve it this way.
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2.7 Simulations Results
The estimated coefficient for β in the probit model is very close to the ”true”
value of 2, while all the estimates of the OLS models have considerable bias. The
rejection rate of the null hypothesis H0 : β = 2 is a reasonable 5.5% for the probit
model.Under this null hypothesis the coefficients for the OLS models should equal
the value of the marginal effect in the probit model, calculated at the mean of the
data, that is Φ(β
−
X)β. The “true” value of this marginal effect is 0.7911 (average)
and the lowest value we obtained for it was 0.7391. We test, for the OLS models, the
null hypothesis H0 : βOLS = 0.79 and the models reject the null all the time. The
results indicate that the OLS estimators are biased and any inference based on them
is confounded.
Imitating the structure of the American League comes at the price of a small
sample size for the OLS models, just 12 observations. To address the potential small
sample issue we have repeated the experiments with a larger number of teams, that is
m=120 and the same number of games.13 The OLS samples are now a reasonable 120
observations while the probit sample has expanded to 14280 observations. The results
are presented in Table 2.7 with each column corresponding to the models previously
presented. The above conclusions are unaffected by the small sample of the OLS,
actually they are reinforced. The small sample bias was reducing the difference be-
tween the “true” value of the coefficient and the one estimated by OLS. Furthermore,
Table 2.8 presents the same results adding the model described by equation (2.9)
estimated without intercept. Table 2.8 also highlights one more inadequacy of the
OLS models, that is the biased estimate of the standard error of the coefficients. For
each experiment, we saved the coefficient estimate and its standard error, the mean
13From an empirical perspective, this is similar with pooling observations across several years.
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of the estimated standard errors should be roughly equal to the standard deviation
of the coefficients estimates. For the models described by the equations (2.5),(2.7)
and (2.9) the mean of the estimated standard errors is biased downward compared
to the standard deviation of the coefficients estimates. Thus, even if the coefficients
estimates would have been unbiased, the inference based on them would have been
confounded. 14
In consequence, we can maintain, based on our Monte Carlo experiments, that
using OLS in models where winning percentage is the dependent variable will provide
biased and inconsistent estimators, and any inference or conclusions based on them
is bound to be confounded. The Monte Carlo experiments justify the approach taken
in this paper of pairing the yearly team’s characteristics with games results and of
using a probit model which is a more reasonable representation of the data generating
process, doesn’t suffer from the double counting problem and takes account of the
strength of the opposition.
2.8 Conclusions
We model the data generating process of a sportive competition as a differ-
ence in the relative strengths of the competing teams. Monte-Carlo experiments sup-
port our contention that this approach improves on the received literature, consisting
mainly in estimating linear models with winning percentage as a dependent variable.
Our experiments suggest that ordinary least squares applied to a linear model with
winning percentage as dependent variable provides biased estimators that confound
any inference based on them. Our modeling procedure also deals with another inad-
equacy of the linear model, the double counting of game information.
14Estimating the model described by equation (2.9) without intercept (see rows 6 to 9 in Table
2.8) reduces the bias of the standard error estimates.
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Using our improved modeling procedure, we allow the relationship between
wage inequality and winning to be non-linear, based on an insight by Lazear (1991),
and we confirm the existence of an optimum level of wage inequality, one which
maximizes the probability of winning any game or, holding constant the winning
potential of a team, minimizes the average wage paid. This result could be reconciled
with most theories about the effect of wage inequality, since each applies on a given
interval of inequality magnitude, nevertheless the only theory that explicitly predicts
an optimal inequality level is the ”tournament theory” of Lazear and Rosen (1981)
and we interpret our results as supporting it.
More than ten papers have been published during the last decade attempting to
empirically test the relationship between wage inequality and firm performance using
data from sports. All previous studies use winning percentage as a dependant variable
in a linear model estimated using OLS or panel data methods.15 This methodological
choice suffers from several drawbacks like the misidentification of the data generating
process, the double counting of game information, and ignoring a possible non-linear
relationship. This paper provides a modeling procedure which avoids this pitfalls.
15The statistical properties of models estimated using winning percentage as a dependent variables
and employing panel data methods are not discussed here.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FT Average Salary 47008 15.074 10.69 2.220 80.11
FT Average Salary2 47008 341.50 528.7 4.928 6418.8
ST Average Salary 47008 14.143 10.26 2.220 80.11
ST Average Salary2 47008 305.36 517.3 4.928 6418.8
FT Gini 47008 0.558 0.081 0.286 0.750
FT Gini2 47008 0.318 0.086 0.082 0.563
ST Gini 47008 0.557 0.080 0.286 0.750
ST Gini2 47008 0.317 0.084 0.082 0.563
FT Salary*Gini 47008 8.640 6.173 0.816 38.87
ST Salary*Gini 47008 8.056 5.856 0.816 38.87
FT Win 47008 0.502 0.500 0 1
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for First and Second Listed Teams
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First Team Obs. Percent Cum. Percentage
ANA 3,337 7.1 7.1
ARI 1,443 3.07 10.17
ATL 3,262 6.94 17.11
BOS 2,775 5.9 29.54
CHA 2,678 5.7 35.24
CHN 3,001 6.38 41.62
CIN 2,720 5.79 47.41
CLE 2,311 4.92 52.32
COL 1,639 3.49 55.81
DET 2,007 4.27 60.08
FLO 1,497 3.18 63.26
HOU 2,136 4.54 67.81
KCA 1,748 3.72 71.53
LAN 1,843 3.92 75.45
MIL 1,504 3.2 78.65
MIN 1,248 2.65 81.3
NYA 1,227 2.61 83.91
NYN 1,615 3.44 87.35
OAK 1,002 2.13 89.48
PHI 1,272 2.71 92.18
PIT 983 2.09 94.28
SDN 818 1.74 96.02
SEA 639 1.36 97.37
SFN 445 0.95 98.32
SLN 253 0.54 98.86
TBA 252 0.54 99.4
TEX 232 0.49 99.89
TOR 52 0.11 100
Table 2.2: Number of Observations per teams used as Dependent Variable
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Variable Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max
Home Adv. Dummy 47008 0.0023 1.0000 -1 1
Salary Diff. 47008 0.9305 9.5731 -66.458 69.883
Salary Squared Diff. 47008 36.147 603.21 -6232.3 6314.1
Gini Diff. 47008 0.0013 0.0735 -0.2742 0.3673
Gini Squared. Diff 47008 0.0017 0.0802 -0.3234 0.4162
Salary*Gini Diff 47008 0.5838 5.2251 -36.624 33.560
Dummy Lag FT Win 47008 0.4960 0.4999 0 1
Dummy Lag ST Win 47008 0.4917 0.4999 0 1
FT Win 47008 0.5018 0.5000 0 1
Table 2.3: Summary of differenced data
Probit Estimation Model Equation (2.1)
Dep. Var. FT Win Coef. S.E. z P-value 95% Conf. Int.
Dummy Lag FT Win 0.0267 0.0095 2.80 0.0050 0.0080 0.0453
Dummy Lag ST Win -0.0240 0.0095 -2.52 0.0120 -0.0427 -0.0054
Home Adv. Dummy 0.0972 0.0058 16.76 0.0000 0.0858 0.1086
Salary Diff. 0.0117 0.0052 2.24 0.0250 0.0015 0.0219
Salary Squared Diff. 0.0000 0.0000 -1.88 0.0600 -0.0001 0.0000
Gini Diff. 1.8933 0.6346 2.98 0.0030 0.6494 3.1371
Gini Squared. Diff. -1.7998 0.6095 -2.95 0.0030 -2.9944 -0.6053
Salary*Gini Diff. -0.0019 0.0082 -0.23 0.8200 -0.0180 0.0143
Table 2.4: Estimation Results without Team Effects
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Probit Estimation Model Equation (2.1)
Dep. Var. FT Win Coef. S. E. z P-value 95% Conf. Int.
Dummy Lag FT Win 0.0276 0.0116 2.37 0.0180 0.0047 0.0504
Dummy Lag ST Win -0.0068 0.0117 -0.58 0.5620 -0.0296 0.0161
Home Adv. Dummy 0.0977 0.0058 16.81 0.0000 0.0863 0.1090
Salary Diff. 0.0185 0.0055 3.35 0.0010 0.0077 0.0294
Salary Squared Diff. -0.0001 0.0000 -3.34 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0000
Gini Diff. 1.9322 0.6738 2.87 0.0040 0.6116 3.2529
Gini Squared. Diff. -1.8536 0.6434 -2.88 0.0040 -3.1147 -0.5925
Salary*Gini Diff. -0.0143 0.0088 -1.63 0.1030 -0.0315 0.0029
Dummy Variables for Team Effects Yes
Table 2.5: Estimation Results with Team Effects
Model eq.(2.1) OLS eq.(2.5) OLS eq.(2.7) OLS eq.(2.9)
Trials 2000 2000 2000 2000
Sample size 924 12 11 11
Coeff. β 2.009 0.467 0.461 0.433
St. Dev. β 0.133 0.096 0.111 0.094
Rej. Rate 0.055 1 1 1
Min 1.614 0.227 -0.033 0.160
Max 2.685 0.836 0.816 0.817
Table 2.6: Results of Monte Carlo Experiments I
Model eq.(2.1) OLS eq.(2.5) OLS eq.(2.7) OLS eq.(2.9)
Trials 2000 2000 2000 2000
Sample size 14298 120 119 119
Coeff. β 2.000 0.397 0.397 0.394
St. Dev. β 0.011 0.028 0.029 0.030
Rej. Rate 0.047 1 1 1
Min 1.962 0.302 0.297 0.284
Max 2.053 0.494 0.496 0.502
Table 2.7: Results of Monte Carlo Experiments II
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
OLS coefficient eq(5) 2000 0.3978 0.0279 0.3015 0.4937
OLS St. Error eq(5) 2000 0.0081 0.0016 0.0034 0.0142
Rejection Rate eq(5) 2000 1
OLS coefficient eq(7) 2000 0.3975 0.0299 0.2970 0.4960
OLS St. Error eq(7) 2000 0.0111 0.0019 0.0057 0.0215
Rejection Rate eq(7) 2000 1
OLS coefficient eq(9) ni 2000 0.3956 0.0837 0.0852 0.6640
OLS St. Error eq(9) ni 2000 0.0756 0.0058 0.0590 0.0966
Rejection Rate eq(9) ni 2000 1
OLS coefficient eq(9) 2000 0.3947 0.0302 0.2838 0.5019
OLS St. Error eq(9) 2000 0.0090 0.0017 0.0040 0.0147
Rejection Rate eq(9) 2000 1
Probit coefficient eq(1) 2000 2.0006 0.0116 1.9623 2.0525
Probit St. Error eq(1) 2000 0.0117 0.0002 0.0112 0.0129
Rejection Rate eq(1) 2000 0.0465
Table 2.8: Results of Monte Carlo Experiments III
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Chapter 3
The Designated Hitter Rule and
the Distribution of Pitching Talent
Across Leagues
3.1 Introduction
The world of sports has proven to be a fertile breeding ground for the artic-
ulation and testing of economic theories Goff and Tollison (1990). Perhaps the best
known example is Rottenberg’s (1956) early paper which applied the logic of the
Coase Theorem (CT) to the labor market for baseball players. He showed theoreti-
cally that the allocation of players across teams in terms of their marginal revenue
products (MRPs) should be invariant to who owns the property rights to players’ la-
bor (owners or players).1 This result is achieved through player trades, and is based
on the presence of low transaction costs and the absence of wealth effects. The advent
1The marginal revenue product of a player is his marginal contribution to a team’s revenues (a
function of wins) through the impact on winning of his marginal product.
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of free agency in 1976 enabled economists to test Rottenberg’s invariance hypothesis
which was basically not supported by the data (more below).
The designated hitter rule (DH) was adopted by the American League (AL)
in 1973, and it allows a team to replace the pitcher with a designated hitter, thus
potentially boosting offensive production. The rule was adopted only by the AL and
thus created a natural experiment embodying talent arbitrage opportunities between
the two leagues. Put simply, all else the same, better hitting pitchers should have
been traded to the National League (NL) and vice-versa, and we should observe a
trading bubble during the immediate period of the regime change. This allows for a
clear test of the CT.
To this end we have used data about pitcher performance (batting and pitch-
ing) in the period prior to 1973 to model the probability of a player being traded
between leagues as a function of the adoption of DH rule. We are restricted to esti-
mating the models only for the pitchers who left the NL for the AL since pitchers who
played in the AL after 1973 did not bat very much (if at all). Non-parametric tests
show that the AL owners acted to acquire pitchers who were worse hitters from the
NL in anticipation of the adoption of DH rule, with most of the adjustment taking
place in the period right before the adoption of the DH rule.2
The major drawback of previous attempts to test the CT using data from
sports is that they are actually joint tests of the existence of several conditions re-
quired by the CT. The main prediction of the CT is that resources (in our case
pitching talent) will be allocated to their highest valued uses. If this condition is
satisfied, and if there are no (or low) transaction costs, and no (or small) wealth
2The DH rule has been analyzed by economists in terms of how it impacted on the number
of plunked batters (moral hazard). There have been various contributions to this debate, with
(Bradbury and Drinen, 2006, 2007) having the latest if not the last word. See their papers and the
references cited there.
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effects, one would observe the same distribution of playing talent before and after, for
instance, free agency.3 The approaches employed have been diverse, from looking at
wins distributions (Quirk and Fort, 1992) and player movement (Hylan et al., 1996;
Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 1994) to changes in small to large market team trades
Surdam (2006). And independently of the results of the test (the first paper supports
the CT, next two reject it, and the fourth is ambiguous), they all involve a test of a
joint hypothesis.4
Our test has the advantage of testing a single hypothesis that changes in MRP
are directing the resources toward their most productive uses,and makes no assump-
tion or inference about auxiliary conditions (transaction costs or wealth effects) other
than the standard ceteris paribus assumption.5 We assume that during the period
used in this study transaction costs and other economic conditions have remained
unchanged (see note 7).
3.2 Model
We model the decision to switch leagues as a latent variable problem (Greene,
2003, p. 669). We assume the decision making unit (team or player) makes a
marginal benefit-marginal cost calculation based on the different MRP of a player in
two different leagues, assuming that the cost of moving is trivial. Let
Y ∗ = X
′
β + ε (3.1)
3This is the interpretation of the CT adopted in previous papers, For example, Hylan et al. (see
1996).
4Cymrot et al. (2001) look at estimated financial gains for players changing teams, conditional
on free agency status. This is closer in spirit to our test in the sense that it is an attempt to test CT
directly by looking at pattern of players’ migration conditional on productivity gains. Their results
support the CT, with player movement being independent of free agent status.
5The test we propose is similar to a market efficiency test, and our methodology is reminiscent
of event studies’ methodology.
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be the expected difference between the MRP of a player if he changes leagues and
the MRP if the player does not changes leagues. We cannot observe either MRP, but
we can observe when a given player changes leagues, that is, when the expected net
marginal revenue change from switching leagues is positive. The usual assumption
that ε has zero mean standard normal distribution with variance one is made. Our
observation is
Y = 1 if Y ∗ > 0 (3.2)
Y = 0 if Y ∗ ≤ 0
with Y = 1 when the player moves from one league to another and zero otherwise.
The probability that a player changes leagues, conditional on a set of observable
characteristics X, is
Pr(Y ∗ > 0|X) = Pr(ε > −X ′β|X) = (3.3)
= Pr(ε < X
′
β|X) = Φ(X ′β)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution. This is the standard probit
model.
3.3 Data
The data used in this study come from The Baseball Databank, version 2006-
11-17, for the performance of each player, and The Retrosheet Project for pitchers’
trades.6 Our data cover the 1960-1985 period, and we take into account only trades
6The Baseball Databank website adress is: http://baseball-databank.org/. The Retrosheet
Project website adress is: http://www.retrosheet.org/.
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between teams. After 1976, some pitchers changed teams and leagues through free
agency, and we do not include these moves in our dataset.7 We also do not count
as a trade instances where pitchers who have played in the AL or NL before, left for
either a minor league or a foreign league, and returned to the AL or NL, since data
about their performance in the intervening years are not available. Overall, we have
9477 pitcher observations, of which only 6052 are usable since we do not observe AL
pitchers batting after 1973. We use on-base percentage plus slugging average (OPS),
both calculated by dividing with at-bats, to measure batting ability. Since pitchers
did not bat after 1973 in AL, it is impossible to calculate their OPS because in most
cases one is dividing by zero at bats. We measure pitching ability by earned run
average (ERA) calculated by multiplying the number of earned runs allowed by nine
and dividing by the number of innings pitched. We also have data about whether a
pitcher switched leagues in a given year, from the NL to the AL, and vice-versa , and
data about the age and experience of pitchers. We control for the amount of pitchers’
playing time with the at bats (AB) and outs pitched (IPouts) variables. Table 3.1
contains summary statistics of all the data and for the two leagues separately. Table
3.2 presents the summary statistics for the NL pitchers for each time period we used
in our analysis.
3.4 Results
We start by observing that 1973 was an active period of readjustment in the
distribution of pitching cum batting talent in the wake of the adoption of the DH
7A free agent released from a NL team who signs with an AL team will not be recorded as
a trade. This ensures that the ceteris paribus assumptions are likely to be satisfied so that, for
example, player preferences for location do not confound a test of the CT. Our procedure will fail
if the free agency eligibility is systematically related to the pitching or batting ability of free agent
pitchers; we have no reason to believe this is the case.
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rule, with a large number of pitchers traded between the two leagues. Figures 3.1 to
3.4 present time series of the number of pitchers traded between the leagues, with the
first two figures displaying all the pitchers, and the last two only the pitchers who
had at least 150 at bats or 50 innings pitched. The spike or bubble in pitchers traded
between the leagues is more noticeable in Figure 3.4 which presents the migration of
pitchers from the NL to the AL.
3.4.1 Empirical Models
We estimate the model presented in equation (3.3) using maximum likelihood,
with the vector X containing player characteristics. We use this model to estimate
the likelihood that a player will move from one league to another. We are interested
in the effect that the skill differentials of the players have on the probability of being
traded between the leagues, and we quantify this difference through the players’ actual
performance statistics in the period just before being traded. We will account for
batting ability(OPS) , pitching ability (ERA), the amount of experience the players
have (Age or Experience), and playing time (AB and IPouts).8 We estimate the
models over the entire time period, and separately over three time periods we deem
of interest, the 1960-1971 period before the adoption of the DH rule, the adoption
period comprised of the years 1972-1973, and the period after the rule was adopted,
from 1974-1985.
Our first empirical model is given by the following equation:
8For example, on December 16, 1970, Grant Jackson was traded from Philadelphia (NL) to
the Baltimore (AL). Thus our TRj variable will take the value one for this observation, with the
performance variables (OPS and ERA) taking the values corresponding to his performance in 1970
for Philadelphia. In 1971, Grant Jackson was no longer traded (between leagues), and he appears
in our dataset as an observation containing the value zero for the TRj variable, and his OPS and
ERA for the year he played in Baltimore.
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TRj = β0 + β1OPSj + β2ERAj + β3ABj + β4IPoutsj + (3.4)
+β5Agej + β6Age
2
j
where j indicates player j, and TRj indicates whether or not a player has changed
leagues. After the adoption of the DH rule, most pitchers did not bat at all in the
AL; consequently, we can estimate the model only for pitchers moving from NL to
AL for the entire period. Table 3.3 presents the results.
We then estimate the model accounting for the originating team (TEj) and
year effects (Y E) through several indicator variables, resulting in the following equa-
tion:
TRj = β0 + β1OPSj + β2ERAj + β3ABj + β4IPoutsj + (3.5)
+β5Agej + β6Age
2
j + β7TEj + β8Y E
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 presents the results
of the model presented in equation (3.5) with standard errors calculated taking into
account possible clustered sampling by players.9
9For more about adjusting for clustered sampling , see Wooldridge (see 2002, p.496). Simply
put, there might be some unobserved personal characteristics that can make a player change teams
more (difficult personality) or less often (leadership), which could make our observations correlated
for a player. Clustering the errors by players treats the observations within a cluster as not being
independent, but treats the clusters as independent from each other. In our case the number of
observations per player varies from 1 to 27, with mean of 5.13 and standard deviation of 4.47.
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3.4.2 Results
The results in Tables 3.3,3.4 and 3.5 do not differ substantially, so we will
discuss the ones in Table 3.3. The coefficient on OPS is significant and negative
during the event period (1972-1973), and ceases to be significant (at the 5 percent
level) before or after that. We can use the marginal effect of OPS (also given in Table
3) to calculate the change in probability due to having batting skills two standard
deviations below average in every period, holding other variables constant at their
mean. For the 1972 and 1973 period, having batting skills two standard deviations
(0.2957 multiplied by 2) below the average, would have increased the pitcher’s trade
probability by 9.8 percent, holding other variables constant at their means. Before
1972 and after 1973, being a subpar batter would not affect the probability that a
pitcher is traded to AL.
Likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the model
described by equations (3.4) are equal across the three periods are presented in Table
3.6, and show that the coefficients are different between the period of adoption of
the DH rule (1972-1973) and either the period before(1960-1971) or the period after
(1974-1985).
Comparing the periods before and after the adoption of the DH rule, we see
that the model coefficients are not significantly different. This suggests that the fac-
tors affecting the players’ MRP differences between leagues before and after 1973 were
the same.10 In the event period we can systematically relate the expected difference
in the MRP of a player in the two leagues to his batting ability, which suggests the
10The coefficient on ERA is significant at the 5 percent level and positive. This means that
the pitchers who were traded were slightly less productive. This is consistent with the findings of
the literature, Hylan et al. (see 1996). Over the entire period, having pitching skills two standard
deviations below average would have increased the probability of being traded to the AL by 2.4
percent, holding other variables constant at their means.
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existence of a disequilibrium situation in the allocation of pitchers’ batting ability.
The ideal would be to test directly the implication that better hitting pitchers will
move to the NL. Since the information about the batting ability of pitchers going to
the NL from AL is not available after 1973, the best we can do is to show that the
pitchers going in the opposite direction (NL to AL) are worse batters. In fact, in
moving from the NL to the AL poor hitting pitchers obtain an increase in their MRP
because they no longer pay a penalty for their batting weakness. The fact that after
1974 we do not observe any systematic adjustments suggests that a new equilibrium
in the distribution of pitching talent across leagues was achieved.
3.4.3 Related Results
Finally, we compare the distribution of batting skills for players who were
traded with the distribution of batting skills for players who did not change leagues.
Figure 3.5 represents the kernel density graph of the OPS variable for pitchers that
changed leagues (moved) and for pitchers that did not move (stayed). We observe
that the distribution of batting skills for the pitchers is not normally distributed. The
value of the Lilliefors test for normality is 0.1522 with a p-value of zero, rejecting the
null that OPS is normally distributed. Similarly, performing the Shapiro-Wilk test
for normality produces a z-value of 15.33, also with a p-value of zero.
Given the non-normal distribution of the pitchers’ batting skill, we proceed
to compare the distribution of movers and stayers in the NL, by year, using a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution. The results are reported
in Table 3.7. We observe that the only years in which the distributions are different
are 1970, 1972 and 1975. In both 1970 and 1972 the p-values are less than 1 percent,
thus rejecting the null that the distributions are identical. Testing the null of the
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equality of distributions of batting skill between pitchers that were traded and those
who were not against the one-sided alternative that the traded pitchers were worse
batters produces p-values of 0.007, for both 1970 and 1972. This means that the
players who were traded to the AL in 1970 and 1972 were really bad hitters compared
with their counterparts who were not traded. We conclude that AL owners moved in
anticipation of adopting the DH rule to acquire the talent from NL league, choosing
ahead of time players whose MRPs would go up once the rule was adopted.11 We do
not know, of course, but the data here are consistent with “insider trading ”.
3.5 Conclusion
The change in regime in the AL, represented by the DH rule, opens the door
to a test of the CT and of Rottenberg’s novel analysis of the distribution of base-
ball talent. It appears that baseball owners and executives are not immune to the
principles of economics or the CT.
11One puzzling result is the one for 1975, where the p-value for largest difference under the
alternative hypothesis that moving players where better hitters than players who stayed in NL
is 0.044. This suggests that the AL was actually acquiring better hitting pitchers, which goes
against the main body of our evidence. To further investigate this we have censored the sample to
observations for which the pitchers had more than four years of experience (sample mean is 4.69)
in any professional league. Since this players’ ability was better observed by the decision makers,
we expect this to increase the signal-to-noise ratio in our sample. Our results (not presented here
but available on request) are robust to this censoring of the sample. Furthermore, performing the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distribution of yearly OPS concludes that the only year
when the two distributions were different across movers and stayers in the NL was 1972, with the
movers group containing smaller OPS values (p-value 0.041 for the null of equality of distributions).
In the censored sample we obtain a clear effect only for the most restricted version of a window (the
year before the rule change).
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
1960-1985
Standard
Variable Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
NL to AL 4438 0.0333 0.1794 0 1
Al to NL 4819 0.0317 0.1751 0 1
OPS 6000 0.3609 0.3738 0 6
ERA 9240 4.5949 3.5892 0.54 108
At Bats 9257 18.4401 29.3673 0 578
IPouts 9257 277.0546 238.7494 0 1130
Age 9257 27.8863 4.4065 18 50
Experience 9257 4.7768 4.3236 0 24
1960-1985 National League
Standard
Variable Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
NL to AL 4438 0.0694 0.2542 0 1
OPS 3989 0.3570 0.3476 0 5
ERA 4431 4.4664 3.1709 0.54 63
At Bats 4438 25.4975 29.8409 0 493
IPouts 4438 279.9087 239.5330 0 1039
Age 4438 27.9441 4.5069 18 50
Experience 4438 4.8680 4.4359 0 24
1960-1985 American League
Standard
Variable Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
Al to NL 4819 0.0608 0.2390 0 1
OPS 2011 0.3686 0.4210 0 6
ERA 4809 4.7133 3.9320 0.57 108
At Bats 4819 11.9407 27.3618 0 578
IPouts 4819 274.4260 238.0202 0 1130
Age 4819 27.8330 4.3119 18 47
Experience 4819 4.6929 4.2163 0 24
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics National League
National League
1960-1971 Before Period
Standard
Variable Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
NL to AL 1890 0.0635 0.2439 0 1
OPS 1692 0.3545 0.3451 0 4
ERA 1886 4.5550 3.0792 0.56 40.5
At Bats 1890 26.6386 30.5046 0 198
IPouts 1890 279.7884 253.1258 0 1007
Age 1890 27.9460 4.7721 18 49
Experience 1890 4.9434 4.5085 0 23
1972-1973 Event Period
Standard
Variable Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
NL to AL 356 0.1348 0.3420 0 1
OPS 317 0.3401 0.2957 0 2
ERA 355 4.6452 3.9012 0.54 54
At Bats 356 27.8371 34.0043 0 305
IPouts 356 288.6938 250.8422 0 1039
Age 356 27.7584 4.3905 20 50
Experience 356 4.9185 4.1638 0 20
1974-1985 After Period
Standard
Variable Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
NL to AL 2192 0.0639 0.2446 0 1
OPS 1980 0.3619 0.3573 0 5
ERA 2190 4.3611 3.1144 0.56 63
At Bats 2192 24.1337 28.4574 0 493
IPouts 2192 278.5858 225.2597 0 1026
Age 2192 27.9726 4.2860 20 45
Experience 2192 4.7947 4.4162 0 24
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DH Period (1972-1973) After DH (1974-1985)
Before DH (1960-1971) LR Test 20.94 4.53
P-value 0.0039 0.7177
DH Period (1972-1973) LR Test ——- 28.49
P-value ——- 0.0002
Table 3.6: Likelihood Ratio Tests of coefficient equality across time periods
76
year Observations K-S test P-value for
equality of distributions
1960 113 0.2643 0.545
1961 99 0.3874 0.132
1962 138 0.2388 0.741
1963 128 0.3115 0.489
1964 143 0.3236 0.435
1965 142 0.1838 0.975
1966 147 0.2908 0.577
1967 153 0.3104 0.129
1968 126 0.3417 0.370
1969 168 0.2640 0.349
1970 178 0.4128 0.007
1971 157 0.1229 0.986
1972 156 0.3937 0.007
1973 161 0.2374 0.129
1974 160 0.2215 0.693
1975 160 0.3616 0.050
1976 165 0.3282 0.328
1977 172 0.2848 0.082
1978 157 0.3020 0.358
1979 171 0.2963 0.316
1980 164 0.1545 0.937
1981 159 0.2517 0.596
1982 164 0.2115 0.804
1983 168 0.1572 0.966
1984 172 0.2562 0.339
1985 168 0.1785 0.869
Table 3.7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions of OPS for
pitchers that changed leagues versus the ones who did not.
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